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THE SECOND-PERSON
STANDPOINT AND THE LAW
INTRODUCTION
Robin Bradley Kar*
One of the most exciting, and, to my mind, potentially fecund
developments in recent moral philosophy is due to a line of thought
developed by Stephen Darwall. In a series of articles that have
recently culminated in The Second Person Standpoint: Morality,
Respect and Accountability, Professor Darwall has begun pressing a
seemingly innocuous and simple claim, but one which may
nevertheless have far-reaching implications for normative theory. It
is this: while moral and political philosophers have, for some time
now, been clear about the distinction between the first-person
standpoint (which includes the standpoint of ordinary practical
deliberation) and the third-person standpoint (which includes the
standpoint of empirical observation), and have sometimes plumbed
this distinction to great effect in their moral thought, they have
typically been unaware-or at least insufficiently aware-of the
distinctive and critical role that the second-person standpoint plays in
our practical lives. The second-person standpoint is the standpoint
we take up when we address one another with claims and grievances,
or respond to such claims with apology, excuse or justification. It is
the standpoint I take up when I confront you in anger for a perceived
wrong, or that you take up in response to me when you say I have no
right to treat you that way, and, in Darwall's view, it is a standpoint
irreducible to the other two.
In his recent work, Darwall has developed a number of
important implications of this distinction, which include, among
other things, an enriched account of what awareness of our practical
freedom amounts to and a distinctive foundation for moral
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obligation, which purports to place contractualist accounts of the
right on a firmer basis. He has also spent time carefully tracing out
important precursors to his thoughts in the history of ethics and
ensuring that his views make moral obligation out to be something
we might actually be capable of attending and responding to, given a
naturalistically sound moral psychology that is attentive to recent
empirical developments. The force and validity of Darwall's views
on moral obligation have already become lively sources of debate
within moral philosophy proper. As I have argued elsewhere,' how-
ever, I believe there is enormous untapped potential in these thoughts
for legal theory as well. Perhaps the broadest such potential lies in
the following fact: Darwall's thoughts point to fundamental features
of legal obligations that cannot easily be accounted for from within a
consequentialist framework. Darwall's work thus presents a robust
and potentially far-reaching challenge to efficiency-based accounts
of many areas of the law. The purpose of this Symposium-which
was organized in coordination with Loyola's Center for
Interdisciplinary and Comparative Jurisprudence-is to prompt
further explorations of that potential.
The Symposium itself consists of a leading piece by Darwall2
and three responses to his work. In the opening contribution,
Darwall describes some of the central propositions defended in The
Second-Person Standpoint. Perhaps the most important and novel
concept he has articulated is that of a "second-personal reason," or a
reason the validity of which is dependent upon authority and
accountability relations between persons, and, therefore, on the
possibility of the reasons being addressed person-to-person.3
Darwall has argued that second-personal reasons are conceptually
implicated in a number of familiar moral notions, including those of
moral responsibility, moral obligation and moral rights. In his
words, these notions represent a circle of irreducibly second-personal
concepts: no second-personal reasons in, no second-personal reasons
out. Moreover, as Darwall observes in his contribution, the main
arguments from his book would appear to apply equally well to the
1. Robin Bradley Kar, Hart's Response to Exclusive Legal Positivism, 95 GEORGETOWN
L.J. 393 (2007).
2. Stephen Darwall, Law and the Second-Person Standpoint, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 891
(2007).
3. Id. at 898.
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analogous family of concepts in the law. Indeed, one illuminating
way to view his project in moral philosophy is as trying to "bring out
the distinctive character of that part of morality that is modeled on
the idea of law."4 It should thus come as no real surprise if these
contemporary developments in moral philosophy end up having
large-scale consequences for legal theory.
One way to begin seeing how transformative these ideas might
be for the law is to contrast second-personal reasons with other
reasons that are more familiar from the legal literature. Second-
personal reasons are distinct from the full set of reasons that arise
from the values of various states of affairs, and, hence, from the full
set of reasons typically acknowledged in the current law and
economics literature. Second-personal reasons are also different
from reasons that operate in first personal deliberation about what to
do merely by settling that question in a conclusive manner. Second-
personal reasons are thus different from what Joseph Raz has called
"exclusionary reasons," and which Raz takes to be partly constitutive
of both defacto and legitimate legal authority. If, as Darwall argues
here, there is an essential relationship between the law and second-
personal reasons, then something critical would therefore appear to
be missing from these contemporary discussions about the law and
its reason-giving force. In Darwall's words, "the concept of law
would seem to be a second-personal concept, that is, one that can
only be defined within the set of interdefinable irreducibly second-
personal concepts"5 that he discusses in his piece.
But what exactly does this tell us about the law? Darwall argues
that two general points follow. First, there is a point about defacto
legal authority, or about the authority that the law purports to have
and that many people-presumably including most officials-
believe the law to have. Darwall argues that we cannot fully
understand the distinctive nature of this authority without seeing the
law, and legal obligations, as giving us the standing to make
demands of one another and hold one another accountable for
various legal transgressions. If this is right, then the law purports to
do more than just guide first personal deliberation about how to act.
It also purports to mediate a number of important interpersonal
authority relations that we have with one another and that give us the
4. Id. at 891.
5. Id. at 900.
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standing to make various legal demands through acts of second-
personal address. Second, Darwall argues that these facts about de
facto legal authority have important implications for when this
purported legal authority might be real. Because the law purports to
give rise to second-personal reasons, and because these reasons
depend for their validity on the possibility of their being addressed
person-to-person, Darwall argues that they must meet certain specific
constraints of mutual acceptability in order to be valid. These
constraints-which do not necessarily apply to reasons of other kinds
in Darwall's view--commit us, in turn, to a fundamentally
contractualist account of legal and political authority of the kind
espoused by T.M. Scanlon and John Rawls. Darwall's work thus
casts significant doubt on the capacity of other familiar normative
principles, such as principles of efficiency maximization, to provide
genuine, stand-alone justifications for legal obligations.
Before concluding his piece, Darwall gestures, finally, towards
applications of his thoughts to the criminal law and tort law. As
Darwall observes, criminal punishment essentially involves holding
people responsible for something they have done based on a finding
of blameworthiness or guilt. Criminal punishment should thus be
understood as implicitly second-personal, according to Darwall. But
this means that neither consequentialist (deterrence-based) nor
orthodox retributivist justifications for criminal punishment can
provide reasons of the right kind for these practices. In order to
determine when these practices are legitimate, we must instead-
according to Darwall-proceed from contractualist standards that we
are implicitly committed to when we take up the second-person
standpoint and hold people responsible for various crimes.
Despite a number of familiar distinctions between public and
private law, Darwall believes that the basic points hold for tort law.
Tort law purports to give us the standing to demand that people act
toward us with a certain requisite level of care, and to demand
compensation for various legal injuries that arise from breaches of
this standard. Concepts like those of compensation (as opposed to a
gift) and injury (as opposed to a harm) cannot, however, be fully
understood-in Darwall's view-except against the backdrop of
what we as individuals have the authority to expect or demand from
one another from the second-person standpoint. Hence, in Darwall's
view, the appropriate standards of care in tort law should also be
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identified by reference to contractualist standards that we are
implicitly committed to when we take up the second person
standpoint and bring claims against one another for negligence.
Although Darwall does not explicitly relate these views to
predominant ones in the tort literature, the implications should be
clear. If Darwall is right, then efficiency-based accounts of tort law
provide justifications of the wrong kind for the rules in this area of
the law; and justifications in terms of principles of corrective justice
would appear, at minimum, to require further elaboration from
within a fundamentally second-personal framework to provide
justifications of the right kind.
In Legal and Other Governance in Second-Person Perspective,6
Aaron James provides an initial response to Darwall, by critically
assessing his arguments for the fundamentally second-personal
nature of morality. In James's view, Darwall's main conclusions
about defacto and dejure moral authority do in fact have natural and
compelling applications to the law and to legal authority-at least in
the context of modern democratic society. But James believes that
the reasons these conclusions apply ultimately undermine Darwall's
broader views about morality's essentially second-personal nature.
In effect, James believes that Darwall's work is ultimately more
applicable to the law than to morality.
To explain this complex set of reactions, James begins by
articulating a distinctive argument for the validity of Darwall's main
conclusions about de facto and de jure authority in application to
democratic legal authority. In James's view, one can derive these
conclusions from special features of the democratic ideal of
collective self-governance-which would render each citizen the
joint author and subject of any duly enacted legislation-along with
the historically contingent proposition that "no one could reasonably
reject democratic society for all the reasons it can seem to be a good
idea-because history has shown that it tends to be less unjust than
authoritarian regimes, because collective self-governance is a worthy
ideal, and so on." According to James, nothing in Darwall's work
rules out this alternative justification for Darwall's main conclusions.
Hence, in James's view, nothing in Darwall's work forces us to
accept that these conclusions arise from a special and irreducibly
6. Aaron James, Legal and Other Governance in Second-Person Perspective, 40 LoY. L.A.
L. REV. 911 (2007).
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second-personal standpoint that we necessarily take up toward one
another in morality and law.
James's arguments would appear to leave much of what is
important about Darwall's work for legal theory intact. His
arguments would nevertheless favor a fundamentally different
understanding of what morality and law are ultimately about.
According to James's favored conception of morality, or "morality
as self-governance," the basic moral (and presumably practical)
problem is one of self-governance-i.e., concerning how each person
is to govern his or her own conduct from the first-person standpoint
of practical deliberation. It should be noted that this idea is a
familiar one from moral philosophy, and one that in one form or
another has typically been presumed in the legal literature as well. In
James's view, considerations of self-governance can, in turn,
sometimes justify either the creation or acceptance of specific
authority and accountability relations, which might appear to be
fundamentally second-personal in nature. This is-after all-
precisely what James has argued for in the case of democratic legal
authority. James argues that the justifications for these relations
nevertheless arise primarily in certain special social and political
contexts, where, absent the standing to make various demands on one
another's conduct, we would likely govern ourselves poorly due to a
number of natural and predictable human frailties. A special
challenge for James's view will be to articulate how precisely
considerations related only to self-governance might give rise to
reasons of the right kind for accountability relations, with all of their
seemingly second-personal features. In the latter parts of his
contribution, James attempts to meet just this challenge.
James closes with an intriguing suggestion about the nature of
these debates. He suggests that in order to adjudicate between
morality as self-governance and Darwall's account of morality as
mutual accountability, we may ultimately need to take a stand on
certain meta-ethical issues concerning the meaning of blame and
related reactive attitudes. In James's view, Darwall's conception of
morality would be helped if expressivism about blame were true; but
would be less plausible if-as T.M. Scanlon has suggested in some
of his unpublished writing-blame need not have any necessary
connection either to expressions of blame or to their perceived
warrant. Whether expressivism about blame is true is a topic that has
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garnered very little sustained attention, but, if James is right, then
this may be an issue that deserves increased attention.
The next contribution is from Gideon Yaffe. In Reasonableness
in the Law and Second-Personal Address,7 Yaffe builds on Darwall's
work to develop a novel account of when references to reasonable
person standards are legitimate in the law. As Yaffe observes, the
law makes reference to the so-called "reasonable person" in
numerous and varied places. To take two of Yaffe's examples, it
does so when defining standards of negligence in tort law, and,
sometimes, when defining the element of force needed to establish a
conviction for rape. As of yet, however, there has been very little
attention paid to the specific question of when, if ever, reference to
the "reasonable person" is legitimate.
Yaffe suggests a particular approach to this question, which
draws heavily on Darwall's work. Rather than trying to define
reasonableness, Yaffe suggests that we try to understand reasonable
person standards as legitimately governing a specific type of
communicative act: namely, the second-personal address of a
second-personal reason. In support of this position, Yaffe draws on
Darwall's arguments concerning the pragmatic presuppositions
involved in acts of second-personal address. Because the validity of
second-personal reasons depends upon the possibility of their being
addressed person-to-person, and, hence, on their acceptability from a
certain common vantage point, reasonable person standards are
directly applicable to questions of liability and culpability, in Yaffe's
view. Facts like these may ultimately help us identify what precisely
reasonableness amounts to in some contexts, but Yaffe's initial aim
is just "to show that the role of reasonableness in the law can be
highly illuminated under the hypothesis that wherever there is a
legitimate appeal to reasonableness in the law, there is an act of
second-personal address being either implemented or regulated."8
Yaffe then applies this approach to test the legitimacy of several
reasonable person standards in the law, beginning with the law of
negligence. In Yaffe's view, when we bring tort claims against one
another seeking to establish liability for negligence, we are, in effect,
asking the court to adjudicate the validity of a second-personal claim,
7. Gideon Yaffe, Reasonableness in the Law and Second-Personal Address, 40 LOy. L.A.
L. REv. 939 (2007).
8. Id. at 942.
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which includes deciding whether the plaintiff has the relevant
authority to give the defendant a (second-personal) reason to have
taken greater care. The court's judgment should thus depend
critically upon whether a reasonable person could accept the
plaintiffs claim from within the space of second-personal
accountability relations-or on whether the defendant, who is the
relevant addressee of the claim, exercised a reasonable amount of
care in the circumstances. Yaffe concludes that this use of a
reasonable person standard in tort law is thus legitimate, and Yaffe's
discussion should leave us with a picture of negligence law that is
deeply vindicating.
The story is more complex, however, when we turn to the
question of how force should be defined in the law of rape. Force is
one of the common elements of rape, but-as with many other legal
concepts-it can be interpreted in either subjective or objective
terms. On the former interpretation, the relevant question is whether
the victim's will was in fact overborne by the defendant's actions,
whereas on the latter, the relevant question is whether a reasonable
person's will would have been overborne. At a certain level of
generality, the element of force in rape thus parallels the criminal
defense of duress, which is typically defined by reference to a
reasonable person standard. Yaffe argues that there is nevertheless
an important asymmetry between these concepts, which can be
clarified by reference to his second-personal account of when
reasonable person standards are legitimate. In particular, Yaffe
argues that it is legitimate to employ a reasonable person standard
when assessing duress as a defense to criminal liability, because
holding someone criminally responsible involves attempting to
engage that person in the second-personal address of a second-
personal reason. Because the relevant question in a rape conviction
is whether the defendant is to blame, rather than whether the victim
is the appropriate object of second-personal censure for not resisting,
however, the reasonable person standard has no such legitimate use
in defining the element of force in rape. As Yaffe observes, many
jurisdictions have already abolished this particular use of the
reasonable person standard in criminal law. If Yaffe is right, then the
rest should follow suit.
In Contract Law and the Second Person Standpoint: Why
Efficiency-Maximization Principles Can Neither Explain Nor Justify
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the Expectation Damages Remedy,9 finally, I try to articulate the
robust challenge that I believe Darwall's work poses to efficiency-
based accounts of the law, using modem contract law as an example.
Modem contract law is one of the areas of law where efficiency
theorists can arguably claim the clearest explanatory advantages-at
least when compared to leading alternative deontological accounts of
contract law, which are typically framed in terms of either private
autonomy or the ordinary morality of promise-keeping. One of the
most oft-cited examples of this purported explanatory advantage lies
in the economist's account of expectation damages in terms of so-
called "efficient breach." If principles of efficiency maximization
cannot, in fact, account for central features of this standard
contractual remedy, then that fact should thus prompt a much more
cautious understanding of the power of efficiency-maximization
principles to account for this area of the law.
In my contribution, I argue that there are, in fact, important
aspects of the standard contract law remedies that cannot be fully
explained or justified in terms of familiar notions like "efficient
breach." In particular, contract law remedies are owed to specific
persons, who are parties to specific contracts, and the legal duties we
have to keep our contracts are thus fundamentally agent-centered in
form. These aspects of contractual remedies can, on the other hand,
be accounted for very easily and naturally from within the second-
person standpoint. I argue that the problem with efficiency-based
accounts of contract law remedies arises from the fact that
consequentialist accounts of reasoning are thoroughly first- and
third-personal, whereas our contractual obligations have irreducibly
second-personal aspects to them.
As discussed, Darwall has argued that we cannot even
understand the notion of an obligation without its giving rise to some
second-personal standing to raise claims for non-compliance. The
law is replete with obligations, and analogous points should therefore
hold for many other areas of the law. I argue that Darwall's work
should thus be viewed as giving rise to a very deep and robust
challenge to the law and economics movement. His work suggests,
9. Robin Bradley Kar, Contract Law and the Second Person Standpoint: Why Efficiency-
Maximization Principles Can Neither Explain Nor Justify the Expectation Damages Remedy, 40
Loy. L.A. L. REv. 977 (2007).
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in effect, that the law and economics movement cannot account for
legal obligations.
If Darwall is right, then when we take up the second-person
standpoint, we are, moreover, committed to a fundamentally
contractualist account of what we owe to one another. In the
remainder of my contribution, I thus develop a contractualist account
of the expectation damages remedy that is, I argue, more robust and
accurate to doctrine than either current efficiency or promise-based
theories. The resulting view suggests the promise of a more
extended contractualist account of contract law-a project that I take
up in future publications. Once again, however, this example
illustrates the very deep challenge that I believe Darwall's work
should be viewed as posing to the law and economics movement.
Darwall's work suggests that an authentic life of obligation will be
constituted by commitments to a standard of the right, and to ways of
interacting with one another, that can neither be reduced to nor
derived from principles of efficiency-maximization. In the end, the
lives we lead with one another under the law-and the reasons we
give to one another in these pervasive social interactions-would
appear to be more than instrumental.
